Price Controls and Consumer Surplus by Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer
Price Controls and Consumer Surplus




Graduate School of Business




Nu¢ eld College, Oxford University
Oxford OX1 1NF, England





The condition for when a price control increases consumer welfare in
perfect competition is tighter than often realised. When demand is linear, a
small restriction on price only increases consumer surplus if the elasticity of
demand exceeds the elasticity of supply; with log-linear or constant-elasticity,
demand consumers are always hurt by price controls. The results are best
understood ￿and can be related to monopoly-theory results ￿using the fact
that consumer surplus equals the area between the demand curve and the
industry marginal-revenue curve.
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1Consider a competitive industry with a completely inelastic supply curve.
Will consumer surplus be increased by price controls that are ￿su¢ ciently
small￿ ? Perhaps surprisingly, there are signi￿cant conditions under which
even this mild case for price controls fails, because of the misallocation caused
by rationing when price does not clear the market.
In the very short run it is clear that a reduction in apartment rents, say,
will increase consumer surplus. Supply is likely to be inelastic, and units are
allocated to the same people who had them without the price controls, so the
price control must primarily transfer wealth from landlords to tenants. But
over the longer run there will be misallocation, even with inelastic supply.
In other markets, such as the market for gasoline, misallocation will be sig-
ni￿cant immediately.1 Of course, as supply falls in response to lower prices
consumer surplus will fall further.
Say that output is allocated randomly amongst those willing to pay more
than the ￿xed price. Then we show that any calculation purporting to show
that price controls bene￿t consumers, necessarily depends on assumptions
about the functional form of demand. For example, price controls always re-
duce consumer surplus with constant elasticity demand, regardless of the as-
sumed or estimated parameters of the demand equation. While tight bounds
can be derived for conditions under which consumer surplus is certain to
decline because of a price control, even if supply is completely inelastic, per-
haps the larger point is that it is not really possible to show persuasively
that a price control has increased consumer surplus ￿ this will typically be
assumed (or assumed away) through a choice of demand speci￿cation.
Our results apply to competitive models2 in which individual consumers
are randomly chosen to either have their demand satis￿ed in full or not at all.
Rental housing is one example; natural gas, where consumers who are sup-
plied receive all they want but not all who wish to be served are supplied, is
another example. If consumers have downward sloping demand and rationing
is imposed the results may or may not apply depending on the e¢ ciency of the
rationing scheme. If, for example, individuals each have identical downward
sloping demand curves, a rationing scheme would e¢ ciently reduce demand
and so, when combined with a price control and su¢ ciently inelastic supply,
will increase consumer surplus. On the other hand, if consumers who would
1We put aside the possible gains from resale markets, which will increase consumer
surplus to the extent that allocative e¢ ciencies are not o⁄set by transactions costs.
2It is well understood that imposing a price control on a monopolist can increase
quantity, consumer surplus, and e¢ ciency.
2buy the most in an uncontrolled market also have the highest average values
per unit then per capita rationing may be worse than random allocation. Re-
garding housing, Glaeser and Luttmer (1997) argue the allocation of rental
units may be worse than random if transient residents, who are unlikely to
secure rent-controlled units, have a higher than average willingness to pay.3
It has long been understood that the losses from price controls include
not just the foregone supply, but also the ine¢ ciency from the fact that the
rationed output may not be allocated to the highest-value consumers. For
example, Friedman and Stigler (1946), and Glaeser and Luttmer￿ s (2003)
well-known study of apartment occupancy in New York City, emphasise these
allocative losses from rent controls; Lott (1990), Luttmer (2007), and Palda
(2000) discuss these costs in the context of minimum-wage legislation; and
MacAvoy and Pindyck (1975), Braeutigam and Hubbard (1986), and Davis
and Killian￿ s (2008) careful recent study, analyse the costs of restricting new
potential consumers￿access to the natural gas market.4
A clear exposition of the standard theoretical analysis of these "alloca-
tive costs" is in Viscusi, Harrington, and Vernon (2005). But quantitative
estimates of welfare losses in the literature mostly depend upon functional-
form assumptions. Furthermore, most papers have focused on the total social
losses (that is, the sum of consumer and producer surplus). There has been
much less discussion of whether consumers are likely to lose on net from
price controls, that is, whether the allocative costs that rationing creates,
combined with the deadweight losses to consumers, are likely to exceed the
rents that price controls transfer from producers to consumers.
The Model
Consider an industry with a demand curve D(p) and a supply curve S(p),
with D0(p) ￿ 0, and S0(p) > 0 (that is, no "backward-bending" supply).
3Our analysis assumes consumers do not dissipate surplus competing for the rationed
good. If, for example, the good is allocated by a queueing system, the time spent waiting
in line will rise to clear the market. If supply is inelastic, then whether consumer surplus
rises or falls depends on whether consumers￿gains from the price reduction are larger
or smaller than the e¢ ciency losses created by both the waiting costs incurred and the
reallocation of goods to consumers with low values but low waiting costs. If low-value,
low-waiting cost buyers have lower incomes, there may be distributional gains from the
price control that our analysis ignores.
4Relatedly, Grafton and Ward (2008) suggest there may be substantial losses when
rationing restricts individuals from making their highest-value uses of the rationed good;
they study the market for water in Sydney, Australia.
3Assume that if a regulator sets a price p below the market clearing level then
demand is randomly allocated among consumers with a value greater than
p.5 So consumer surplus at the controlled price, CS(p), equals consumer
surplus if the market cleared at p (that is,
R 1
p D(x)dx6) times the ratio of









Di⁄erentiating with respect to a small decrease in price ￿dp yields
￿CS














That is, the total change in consumer welfare is the sum of three e⁄ects.
First, the reduced price paid by the total number of buyers, S(p): Second,
the reduction in market supply, S0(p); times the average surplus of the old
buyers,
R 1
p D(x)dx=D(p). Third, the number of new buyers who will displace
old buyers ￿that is, the number of new buyers, ￿D0(p); times the fraction
who will be served, S(p)=D(p) ￿times the negative of the average surplus of
the old buyers (since the new buyers receive no surplus while the displaced
buyers received the average).
Now if demand D(p) is log-convex then, since also D(1) = 0,
R 1
p D(x)dx
is also log-convex,7 that is, (￿D0(p))(
R 1
p D(x)dx) > (D(p))2: So the loss
from the last term in (2) exceeds the gain from the ￿rst term. That is, the
reduction in consumers￿average values exceeds the reduction in the price they
pay. It follows that any price reduction reduces consumers￿welfare because
the middle term in (2) - the decrease in supply - only exacerbates their loss.
So for any su¢ ciently "fat-tailed" demand,8 for example, with log-linear, or
constant-elasticity, demand, consumers are always hurt by price controls.
5This is the standard assumption made in, for example, Viscusi, Harrington, and Ver-
non (2005).
6We assume this integral is ￿nite. Su¢ cient conditions are that demand is ￿nite at
p; and is elastic (elasticity of demand ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ", for some strictly positive constant ")
for all prices above some ￿nite price. So, for example, constant elasticity demand with
inelastic demand ( ￿ ￿ ￿1) is ruled out.
7See, for example, Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005, Theorem 4). Earlier references on
the role of log-curvature are PrØkopa (1971) and An (1998).
8Even for goods for which individual demand is "thin-tailed", aggregate consumer
demand may be fat-tailed when income distribution is very unequal.
4MR Interpretation
Using the fact that consumer surplus equals the area between the demand
curve and the marginal revenue curve (because the area under the MR curve







0(v)[v ￿ MR(v)]dv (3)
since ￿D0(v) is the density of consumers with a value of v:
















p ￿D0(v)[v ￿ MR(v)]dv
D(p)
#
Formula (4) can be interpreted by recognizing that [p ￿ MR(p)] is the
increment in consumer surplus in an open market, caused by a price reduction






the average consumer surplus. So the change in consumer surplus due to the
price control is given by the number of new customers, ￿D0(p), times the
probability that they will be served, S(p)=D(p), times the marginal consumer
surplus, less the reduction in number of existing consumers who will be served
(the number of new customers who displace old ones plus any supply e⁄ect)
times the average consumer surplus of the existing customers.



















Since ￿Supply ￿ 0 the equation implies that a su¢ cient condition for
consumer surplus to decline is that Average CS > Marginal CS.10
9We can derive (4) directly from (2) using MR(p) ￿ p + D(p)=D0(p) (the derivative
of total industry revenue pD(p) with respect to quantity D(p) in an uncontrolled market
with price p):
10This is analagous to Spence￿ s (1975) result that whether a pro￿t-maximizing monopo-
list over- or under-provides quality depends whether the marginal value of quality is higher
for the marginal or the average consumer.
5Figure 1 provides a simple graphical analysis for a discrete price change
assuming no supply e⁄ect. When price is reduced from the market level
P Market to the controlled level P Control; demand increases from D(P Market)
to D(P Control): Were the decline in price due to a shift in the supply curve,
consumer surplus would increase from CSMarket to CSMarket+XCS; the area
between the demand and marginal revenue curves in the range of D(P Market)
to D(P Control):11 But with price controls there is an o⁄setting loss of consumer
surplus because supply will at best remain constant. Therefore, while the
lower price increases consumer surplus by the average height of XCS times
the number of new customers served, there are at least an equal number of
consumers who are displaced by the controls. Those consumers had received
an average consumer surplus equal to the average height of CSMarket. For
the demand curve pictured in Figure 112 the di⁄erence between the demand
and marginal revenue curves is declining at all but very small quantities, and
so the average height of CSMarket is greater than the average height of XCS.
So the loss in consumer surplus due to un￿lled demand exceeds the gain due
to the lower price, even before considering any decline in supply.
Relationship to Monopoly Results
Our condition also has simple monopoly-theory interpretations. Speci￿-
cally, a small tightening of the price control always reduces consumer surplus
if the constant-marginal-cost monopolist that would set the same price on the
demand curve (as the current price control) would generate greater (total)
consumer surplus than (total) pro￿ts. Since the monopolist sets MR(p) =
MC = AC, the pro￿t per unit of a constant-marginal-cost monopolist is
equal to p￿MR(p); which is just marginal CS. So equation (5) tells us that
if marginal CS = average pro￿t is less than average CS, then ￿CS will be
negative when we tighten a price control.
It also follows that any price control reduces consumer surplus for any
demand curve on which a constant-marginal-cost monopolist would always
pass through more than 100% of any (marginal) tax or cost increase. Perhaps
the best way to see this is to note that a monopolist￿ s pass-through rate
11Of course little of the incremental consumer surplus goes to the new purchasers; the
area XCS is the amount of surplus gained by all consumers when price falls by enough
to attract D(PControl) ￿ D(PMarket) additional purchasers.




￿ 1 for 3 < p ￿ 83:









￿and it is easy to see from Figure 1 that if the slope of the demand curve
is steeper than the slope of the MR curve, then marginal consumer surplus
is less than average consumer surplus and so consumer surplus falls due to
the price control.14 Of course, this result also follows from our earlier result
that a price control reduces consumer surplus on any log-convex demand,
together with the standard result that a constant-marginal-cost monopolist￿ s
(or Cournot oligopoly￿ s) pass-through exceeds 100% if and only if demand is
logconvex.15
Again, these results apply even with a perfectly-inelastic supply curve;
any elasticity of supply makes consumers even worse o⁄.
Example
A simple functional form for illustrating our results is the Generalized








13Or write MR(p) = MC ) p + D(p)=D0(p) = MC, which determines the equi-

























slope of MR : See Bulow and P￿ eiderer (1983); Fabinger and Weyl (2008) describes the
general relationship between pass-through and monopoly.
14Or, writing v(p) for the average value of consumers with values ￿ p, and AR for
average revenue, if the slope of demand is steeper than the slope of MR, then [v(p) ￿ p] >
[AR ￿ MR]. So since AR = p, and MR = MC; we have [v(p) ￿ p] > [p ￿ MC], that is,








i which exceeds 1 if and only if D(p)D00(p) >
(D0(p))2, that is, D(p) is log convex. (The result extends straightforwardly to a Cournot
oligopoly: ￿rm i, with marginal cost MCi, i = 1;:::n, has equilibrium condition p +
siD(p)=D0(p) = MCi, in which si is i￿ s market share. Summing over all n ￿rms yields










i which, as before, exceeds 1 if and only if D(p) is log convex.)
For a very general analysis of pass-through under imperfect competition see Weyl and
Fabinger (2009).
7Special cases of the GPD are linear demand (when ￿ = ￿1), constant
elasticity (when ￿￿ ￿ ￿ = 0 and ￿ > 0), and log-linear demand (when ￿ !
0).16 With the GPD, MR(p) = ￿￿￿￿ +(1￿￿)p, so the ratio of the slope of
the demand curve to the slope of the marginal revenue curve is a constant,
1=(1￿￿). The average consumer surplus, is therefore 1
1￿￿ times the marginal
consumer surplus, p ￿ MR(p):17
For example, with linear demand ￿ = ￿1 and the slope of the marginal
revenue curve is twice that of the demand curve, so average consumer surplus
is half of marginal consumer surplus (that is, the average buyer￿ s surplus is
half of the extra consumer surplus generated by lowering the price enough to
sell an additional unit).






















The best case for price controls is when supply is completely inelastic so
S0(p) = 0: In this case, if ￿ < 0 then demand is log-concave and consumer
surplus is always increased by a reduction in the price. But if ￿ ! 0, as with
log-linear demand, then even with inelastic supply the misallocation problem
balances the lower prices; and consumer surplus is independent of the price
level. For constant-elasticity demand, 1 > ￿ > 0; any reduction in price
below the market-clearing level reduces consumer surplus, as (5) and (6) are
both clearly positive.
Obviously, the more sensitive is supply to price the less consumers will
gain from any price reduction. Whether they will gain from a small reduction
below the market clearing price, where S(p) = D(p); depends on whether
￿ D0(p) > S0(p): So even with linear demand a small restriction on price will
only increase consumer surplus if the (absolute value of) demand elasticity
is greater than the elasticity of supply.
16We assume ￿ < 1 so that consumer surplus is ￿nite.
17So also a constant-marginal-cost monopolist passes through 1=(1￿￿) of any marginal
tax or cost increase, and the ratio of consumer surplus to pro￿ts generated by such a
monopolist that would set the same price as the price control would be 1 : (1 ￿ ￿).
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